Overinvestment of free cash flow is an important means for manager to get private benefits. Based on the construct of free cash flow and overinvestment, taking Chinese non-financial listed companies between 2003 and 2007 as sample, this paper empirically examines whether the improvement of corporate governance environment can restrains the behavior of over -investment caused by free cash flow, and then investigates whether the above effect of corporate governance environment is influenced by the nature of the firm's ultimately controllers. Our study provides direct evidence of the over-investment of free cash flow. Research on investment decision -making of listed companies should attach great importance to the company governance environment. On the other hand, the role of governance environment is associated with company control nature of people. The privatization of state-owned enterprises is conducive to reducing excessive investment of free cash flow. Only improving the exter-nal governance environment and, therefore, company's microscopic governance mechanism, more effectively alleviate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, and increase the value of the company.% 使用自由现金流进行过度投资是经理获取私利的重要手段。本文以我国2003-2007年的上市公司为样本，实证检验了了公司治理环境能否约束自由现金流的过度投资，以及控制人性质能否影响公司治理环境的这种约束作用。结果发现，上市公司的自由现金流，尤其是正的自由现金流时，将会导致企业过度投资行为的发生，好的公司治理环境有利于抑制自由现金流的过度投资，但这种抑制作用仅仅在民营上市公司才较为明显。我们的研究一方面为自由现金流的过度投资提供了直接证据，同时也表明，研究上市公司投资决策要高度重视公司所处的治理环境；另一方面治理环境的作用又与公司最终控制人性质有关，稳定有序地推进国有企业的民营化有利于降低自由现金流的过度投资。由此可见，只有同时改进外部治理环境和公司的微观治理机制，才能更有效地缓解经理人与股东的利益冲突，增进公司价值。
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