异质群体中道德风险与共享资源的合作治理研究

摘要

本文通过博弈模型分析及其简化的数值模拟,得出了与传统的共享资源合作治理研究有较大分歧的结论:道德风险可能并不像传统理论所表明的那样必然对共享资源的合作治理存在负效应,而单纯一味的追求降低道德风险,有时可能并不利于共享资源的合作治理.在异质群体的规模较大而初始组织成本足够低的情况下,当个体的努力水平不可观测时,由于道德风险的存在,尽管对个体的努力水平有削弱作用,但相对于没有道德风险的场景下,它激励了更多的个体加入到发起人组织,扩大了发起人组织的规模,有利于共享资源的合作治理.%Through game model analysis and simplified numerical simulation, this paper reaches a conclusion which is quite different from the traditional research on the cooperative governance of common-pool resources: that moral hazard would necessarily bring negative effects on the cooperative governance of common-pool resources, as the traditional theory suggests, is not always true. On the contrary, the insatiable pursuit of reducing moral hazard may sometimes be disadvantageous to the cooperative governance of common-pool resources. When the heterogeneous groups is large in scale, the initial organization cost is low enough and the individual effort level is unobservable, the existence of moral hazard, compared to the absence of it, although weakens the individual effort level, but encourages more individuals to join the organization of initiators and thus expands the scale of it, which is beneficial to the cooperative governance of common-pool resources.