公司股权结构、经理市场与管理层激励

摘要

In this paper, we find that the existence of relative concentrated share holdings is important tothe corporate governance. And the more the large stockholder holds of a firms' stock, the more theprofessional managers will be able to share the residual claimant right. We also argue that a developedmanager's market will be favorable to the benefits of principals and the equilibrium of incentive contract isalso influenced by the agents' risk aversion.%公司股权结构的差异直接影响着公司管理层(代理人)的利益实现，大股东控股比例越高则对于代理人的均衡激励也越多，反之亦然。另一方面，经理市场的存在使得委托代理合约均衡中的最优剩余索取权分配变得更加有利于委托人而不是代理人。