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一种对抗协作频谱感知中拜占庭攻击的博弈论方法

机译:一种对抗协作频谱感知中拜占庭攻击的博弈论方法

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为了解决协作频谱感知中的拜占庭攻击问题,提出了一种非合作博弈论方法实现了对拜占庭攻击的有效防御.首先,基于所提非合作博弈论方法,从拜占庭攻击者和网络管理员的角度分析了协作频谱感知中纯粹的拜占庭攻击和防御策略,并定义了双方纯粹策略的成本和收益.其次,推导出双方的混合策略,利用Lemke-Howson算法得到闭合形式的纳什均衡,进一步分析了效益比和惩罚率对非合作博弈动态过程的影响.仿真结果表明,所提出的博弈论方法能够有效地防御拜占庭攻击,并节省防御成本.%In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing, a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense. First, under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory, the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator. The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly, the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore, the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the non-cooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.
机译:为了解决协作频谱感知中的拜占庭攻击问题,提出了一种非合作博弈论方法实现了对拜占庭攻击的有效防御.首先,基于所提非合作博弈论方法,从拜占庭攻击者和网络管理员的角度分析了协作频谱感知中纯粹的拜占庭攻击和防御策略,并定义了双方纯粹策略的成本和收益.其次,推导出双方的混合策略,利用Lemke-Howson算法得到闭合形式的纳什均衡,进一步分析了效益比和惩罚率对非合作博弈动态过程的影响.仿真结果表明,所提出的博弈论方法能够有效地防御拜占庭攻击,并节省防御成本.%In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing, a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense. First, under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory, the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator. The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly, the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore, the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the non-cooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.

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