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基于节水激励的农业水费分担模式设计

     

摘要

提高农业用水价格可以达到节约用水的目的,但是会增加农民的水费负担。只有建立科学的激励机制,才能解决农业水价、农业节水和农民负担三者之间的内生性矛盾。借鉴利益相关者理论,设计了基于节水激励的农业水费分担模式,将减轻农民负担与节水激励有机结合,不仅能够解决农业水价改革中可能导致农民水费负担过重的问题,还能有效地调动农业用水供需双方的节水积极性,有助于转变我国粗放的农业用水方式,缓解部分地区水资源短缺的困境。%Improving agricultural water price can rise to the purpose of saving water. But it can increase the burden of the farmers' water fees. There are inner contradiction between agricultural water saving, water price and farmers' financial burden. Draw lessons from the related ideas of game theory, this article designs an agricultural water cost sharing model based on the water-saving incentive, which will reduce the burden on farmers and water-saving incentive organic union, can not only solve the problem that the agricultural water price reform may lead to heavy water burden of farmers, but also effectively arouse the enthusiasm of agricultural water supply and demand of water saving, and help to change the extensive mode of agricultural water, ease the plight of water shortages in some areas.

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