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Internal incentives and operations strategies for the water-saving supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

机译:节水与贸易管制的节水供应链的内部激励机制和运营策略

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摘要

Faced with the rapid development of modern industries of agriculture,manufacturing,and services,water resources are becoming increasingly scarce.Industries with high water consumption are generally regulated by the government's water cap-and-trade (CAT) regulation to solve the contradiction between the limited water supply and the rapid growing water demand.Supply chain equilibrium and coordination models under the benchmark scenario without water saving and CAT regulation,water-saving supply chain equilibrium and coordination models under the scenario without/with CAT regulation are developed,analyzed and compared.The corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses for all models are conducted and compared,and the managerial insights and policy recommendations are summarized in this article.The results indicate that (1) Conducting water saving could improve effectively the operational performance of the water-saving supply chain under the scenario without/with CAT regulation.(2) The coordination strategy based on the revenue sharing contract could efficiently coordinate the water-saving supply chain,enhance water consumption reduction rate,and improve the operational performance of the water-saving supply chain.(3) The implementation of CAT regulation enhances effectively water-consumption-reduction in the water-saving supply chain and improves the operational performance of water-saving supply chain.(4) Simultaneous implementation of CAT regulation by the government and adopting coordination strategy by the water-saving supply chain would be superior to any other scenarios/strategies.(5) A suitable water cap based on the industrial average water consumption and historical water consumption data are beneficial for constructing reasonable and effective incentive mechanism.(6) A higher marginal trade price could induce more reduction in water consumption and create better operational performance for the manufacturer and water-saving supply chain,both under the equilibrium and coordination strategies.
机译:面对现代农业,制造业和服务业的快速发展,水资源变得越来越稀缺。高耗水量的行业通常由政府的“水上限额与贸易”(CAT)法规来规范,以解决水资源与工业之间的矛盾。有限的水供应和快速增长的需水量对所有模型进行了相应的数值和敏感性分析,并进行了比较,总结了管理的见解和政策建议。结果表明:(1)进行节水可以有效地提高节水供应的运行性能。在没有/有CAT规定的情况下的链条。(2)基于收益共享合同的协调策略可以有效地协调节水供应链,提高节水率,提高节水供应链的运营绩效。(3)CAT法规的实施有效地提高了用水量-减少节水供应链,提高节水供应链的运营绩效。(4)政府同时实施CAT法规并在节水供应链中采取协调策略将优于其他任何方案/策略。(5)基于行业平均用水量和历史用水量数据的合适用水上限有利于构建合理有效的激励机制。(6)较高的边际贸易价格可以促使更多的用水量减少并创造更好的用水量制造商和节水供应链的运营绩效,均处于平等库和协调策略。

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  • 来源
    《工程管理前沿(英文版)》 |2019年第1期|87-101|共15页
  • 作者单位

    Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China;

    Stem School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012,USA;

    Business School, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China;

    State Key Laboratory of Hydrology-Water Resources and Hydraulic Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China;

    Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;

    College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;

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