非对称双寡头企业实物期权博弈分析

摘要

Aim To study how the difference of maket share and investment cost affects duopoly enterprises' investment critical value. Methods Real option game theory and mathematical analysis. Results Higher market share and lower investment cost can reduce investment critical value, unbalanced difference affects duopoly enterprises in racing to clutch at game opportunity. Conclusion When an enterprise has a dominant market share and investment cost, becoming a maket leader is the optimal choice. While an enterprise can become a follower and acquire a better achievement when it has only one advantage.%目的 分析市场占有率和投资成本因素的差异对双寡头企业抢滩阈值的影响.方法 期权博弈理论和数值分析.结果 较高的市场占有率、较低的投资成本降低抢滩博弈阈值,不均衡差异影响双寡头企业抢滩博弈时机.结论 市场占有率和投资成本均占优的情况下,成为领先者是最佳选择；只有一项优势的情况下,成为追随者也会取得较好的业绩.