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基于技术溢出与吸收能力的双寡头企业研发微分博弈分析

     

摘要

在综合考虑技术溢出效应和吸收能力两方面因素情形下,研究两家寡头企业之间的研发投入量、产量随时间变化的瞬时协调和相互竞争的博弈过程,以期获得竞争企业的R&D最优竞争战略. 通过将传统AJ模型拓展为动态微分博弈模型,该新模型所蕴涵的丰富动力学内涵有利于对寡头企业R&D竞合机理的探索. 借鉴微分对策的思想,结合最优控制理论中Pontryagin极大值原理,分析给出了新微分博弈模型的均衡解的充分必要条件,同时通过对均衡解的数值仿真计算分析,得到了知识溢出水平和知识吸收能力对R&D竞争策略的影响. 为竞争企业通过选择不同的R&D竞合战略来达到自身效益最大化或者成本最小化提供了可供选择的实现路径.%In order to gain the best R&D competitive strategy of competitive corporations, the amount of investment in R&D, the instantaneous coordination of production and the game process of competition are analyzed, with the factors of the technology spillovers and absorptive capacity considered.By expanding the traditional AJ models to dynamic differential game models, rich dynamic connotation implies that the new model is beneficial to exploring the competing mechanism of duopoly R&D.Based on the methodology of differential games, combined with Pontryagin maximum principle used in optimal control theory, suffi-ciency and necessity for the equilibrium solution are given; simultaneously, by a numerical simulation a-nalysis of equilibrium solution, the R&D competition strategy is found to be affected by technology spillover and absorptive capacity.This research provides options for achieving path for competing companies to a-chieve their own maximum benefit or cost minimization by choosing different R&D competing strategies.

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