首页> 外文期刊>Information Technology Journal >R&D Subsidy, Spillovers and R&D Cooperation in Duopoly
【24h】

R&D Subsidy, Spillovers and R&D Cooperation in Duopoly

机译:双寡头的研发补贴,溢出和研发合作

获取原文
       

摘要

This study introduces the degree of R&D cooperation as an endogenous in a duopoly with R&D subsidy and spillovers. We examine the subsidy policy and find that the optimal degree of R&D subsidy is a constant in order to maximize social total welfare. And the further analysis shows, under the best R&D subsidy and positive spillovers, the best R&D strategy for the firms in duopoly is R&D cooperation to maximize their profit and social total welfare. Furthermore, the greater is the technological spillovers, the greater should be the firm?s profit and social total welfare which the duopoly can gain from R&D cooperation.
机译:本研究介绍了在具有研发补贴和溢出效应的双头垄断中,研发合作的程度是内生的。我们研究了补贴政策,发现为了最大程度地提高社会总福利,R&D补贴的最佳程度是一个常数。进一步的分析表明,在最佳的研发补贴和积极的溢出效应下,双寡头企业的最佳研发策略是研发合作,以最大化其利润和社会总福利。此外,技术外溢越大,双寡头可以通过研发合作获得的企业利润和社会总福利就应该越大。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号