供应中断下双源采购的供应链契约设计

摘要

This paper considers contracts designing for a two -stage chain consisting of a manufacturer and two suppliers . We treat the supplier of whose reliability obedient to random distribution as a main supplier , and treat the supplier of zero or all as a secondary sup-plier . Based on the profit maximization as the goal , establishing a dynamic programming model of a two -stage game -signing contracts stage and execution stage , we get the manufacturer’s optimal contract design . The manufacture makes a decision of signing contracts with only one supplier , both suppliers or neither according to the retail price of products , and the suppliers decide the optimal production scale based on the content of contracts . The research indicates that the optimal production scale shows as a negative correlation with per unit of the cost of production , and a positive correlation with per unit of variable payment and punishment cost . The order quantity of the sec-ondary supplier presents a positive correlation with its own reliability , and a negative correlation with the reliability of the main supplier . The mixed payment has a negative correlation with its corresponding reliability .%考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计问题，将可靠性服从随机分布的供应商作为主供应商，将完全中断供应商作为次供应商，建立以利润最大化为目标的签约和执行两阶段博弈的动态规划模型，得到制造商的最优契约设计。制造商根据产品零售价格的变化灵活做出只与一个供应商签约、与两个供应商同时签约或都不签约的决定，供应商根据契约设计内容决定自己的最优生产规模。研究表明：供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关，与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关；次供应商的订货量与其本身的可靠性呈正相关，与主供应商的可靠性呈负相关；供应商的固定支付与其相应的可靠性呈负相关。