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相互投资与人力资本投资对研发外包决策影响研究

         

摘要

本文运用产权理论模型,通过分析最优和次优两种状态下企业和研发机构的均衡投资水平,重点讨论企业和研发单位自我投资和相互投资对研发外包决策的影响,并通过进一步揭示物质资产与人力资产在研发外包中的作用,提出根据专用性投资的特点调整研发外包策略,继而实现最优的研发效果.研究结果表明:相互投资弹性更高的一方更应该拥有外包的所有权;企业应根据双方相互投资的投资弹性高低调整研发外包策略;外包项目中人力资本投资比物质资本投资更重要.研究结果对企业有效利用研发外包进行创新提供了有力的理论指导.%An increasing number of companies are investing in R&D activities in order to gain sustainable competitive advantages in the global economy. Limited internal resources force many companies to outsource part or all of their R&D activities, and has resulted in the establishment of new value creation models. Although extended R&D activities are essential to open innovation, the current R&D outsourcing literature neglects the cooperative innovation relationship between R&D partners and does not make assumptions based on the relationship.Conventional property right theory emphasizes on physical asset. However, R&D activities primarily involve the investment of intangible human capital. It is unclear about the potential influence of human capital and physical asset investment on property rights for R&D outsourcing activities. Built upon the property right theory, this paper first examines the investment equilibrium for R&D outsourcing partners under two different conditions. Second, we show the impact of self-investment and cross-investment on R&D outsourcing decisions. Third, we investigate the roles of physical and human capital assets in R&D outsourcing mechanisms.The first part of this paper introduces our proposed model structure. Expected payoff of R&D outsourcing partners is a function of potential R&D output values, and the probability of R&D project success. Ownership structure determines the payoff of R&D outsourcing partners under non-cooperative conditions. According to the Coarse theorem, the ownership structure can maximize the total surplus of social welfare, followed by the equilibrium result that can maximize payoffs for each R&D outsourcing partner. We further employ a comparative static analysis on the elasticity of self-investment and cross-investment for ownership structure, and on the effect of potential R&D output values on ownership allocation. The analysis results indicate that R&D partners with higher investment elasticity own R&D assets.When the potential R&D output value is high, the outsourcing company that has crucial R&D resources will own R&D assets. The higher the cross-investment elasticity the outsourcing company has for its R&D partner, the better the company can conduct internal R&D activities. In contrast, the higher the cross-investment elasticity the R&D partner has for the outsourcing company, the better the company outsources R&D activities. On the contrary, when the research unit has R&D resources the higher the cross-investment elasticity a company has for research unit,the better a company can outsource R&D activities to the research unit. The higher the cross-investment elasticity of the research unit to the company,the better the company can conduct R&D activities internally.In the last part, this research examines the effect of human capital and physical capital investment on R&D outsourcing decisions. Analysis results show that human capital investment is more important than physical capital investment in R&D outsourcing decisions. R&D partners that have more specific human capital investment should implement R&D activities internally.

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