Private financial consortium has been an effective channel for governments to source capital for construction and operation of infrastructure projects. Although BOT has been widely used by governments to source sufficient capital, this method has many disadvantages, such as low involvement by the government, high risks to investors, and sustained conflicts between investors and the government. Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) are an alternative channel and can overcome the weaknesses inherent in the B0T method. Project stakeholders, including the government and companies, are motivated to be involved in managing the infrastructure project because PPP method can create a win-win situation. The government also has more ownership in PPP mode than in BOT mode.This study uses the game theory to assess the investment ratio of each party in a highway project that uses PPP mode in order to validate propositions. A dynamic game model with complete information is introduced to analyze how the pricing decisions of a private consortium may affect the optimal ownership structure. This dynamic game model enables us to compare pricing and social benefits of the studied highway project in BOT and PPP models. Our analysis results show that BOT and PPP modes have the same charging prices because the private consortium always pursues the maximum profit to benefit itseff. PPP mode allows government to realize a higher return on investment than BOT mode.In this paper, we first discuss issues related to highway project pricing and optimal decision making in the PPP mode. The PPP model enables the government to choose the best shareholder ratio according to project risks. The PPP model can lead to better investment structure and minimize project risks. Second, we compare PPP and BOT models with respect to their different effects on government's revenues. Although the financing mode has no effect on public interests, it has differential effects on government's revenues. The government may want to consider adopting the PPP mode when sourcing capitals from private companies to develop infrastrnctural projects.In summary, the private consortium will determine the charging price that can maximize its profit. Therefore, the charging price will not vary with financing modes. However, the government can receive greater return on investment from PPP mode than BOT mode.%运用博弈论的模型和方法,研究了PPP模式下政府与私营财团合作建造和运营一条高速公路时,新建高速公路的定价与项目最优股权结构问题.并与BOT模式下新建高速公路定价与政府收益进行了对比研究.研究结果表明:在有效激励的条件下,两种模式的最优收费价格相同.但是,政府在BOT模式下的收益显著低于PPP模式下的收益.
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