We investigate vertical integration of two competing supply chains,each consisting of a manufacturer,a supplier,and a retailer.The supplier offers components to its manufacturers and make effort to lower cost through R&D motivation.The manufacturer is engaged in product manufacturing.The retailer orders products from manufacturer and resell products to market.More prior papers focus on the two-tier supply chain and discuss only the forward integration for manufacturers.Different from them,we analyze strategic behaviors of supply chain players in a three-tier supply chain and consider that each manufacturer has one of the three strategies to choose:decentralization,forward integration,or backward integration.Therefore,there are six possible configurations:NN,SS,RI,SN,RN,SR.where N denotes no integration,S denotes backward integration,and R denotes forward integration.We study the effect of vertical integration on cost,product price,and profitability,and identify a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of the competing supply chains.We find that:(i) When one of manufacturers is not vertically integrated,the other manufacturers' forward integration strategy mainly depends on the intensity of competition between the two chains.Backward integration strategy relies heavily on innovation investment cost coefficient.In addition,two kinds of integration choice (i.e.,forward integration and backward integration) only depend on the innovation investment cost coefficient.(ii) When one of manufacturers chooses forward integration or backward integration,the integration strategy is more valuable to the other manufacturers than no integration strategy.For two kinds of integration choice,if innovation investment cost coefficient is low,the other manufacturers prefers backward integration strategy.If the innovation investment cost coefficient is high,the other manufacturers prefer forward integration strategy.(iii) In addition,the dynamic integration process of manufacturers is not only related with the innovation of investment cost coefficient,but also affected by the intensity of competition between the two chains.That is,when the intensity of competition is not strong,and if innovation investment cost coefficient is low,backward integration strategy is the dominant equilibrium.If the innovation investment cost coefficient is high,forward integration strategy is a unique and dominant equilibrium.When the two chains competition and innovation investment cost coefficient are relatively high,decentralization strategy is the best option for both manufacturers.(iv) At last,the cost-saving by technological innovation is increasing with the number of supply chains with vertical integration.The retail price is decreasing with the number of supply chains with vertical integration.In another word,integration strategy helps reduce cost and retail price.%基于竞争供应链市场,以供应商,制造商和零售商组成的三级供应链模型为基准,考察了创新驱动下三级供应链的纵向整合策略与两条链竞争对制造商利润的影响,并识别出每种整合策略选择的条件及其均衡特征.同时,从社会效益和消费者角度讨论了最优整合策略.研究发现:当一个制造商不进行整合时,另一个制造商对前向一体化的选择主要取决于两条链的竞争强度,对后向一体的选择严重依赖于创新投资成本系数.这显著不同于,两种整合策略的选择(即前向一体化和后向一体化)只依赖于创新投资成本系数.同时,制造商整合策略选择的动态过程不仅与创新投资成本系数相关,还受到两条链间竞争强度的影响,且两条链竞争程度不强时,若创新投资成本系数较小,则向后一体化策略为最终的占优均衡;若创新投资成本系数较大,则向前一体化策略为最终的占优均衡;若两条链竞争与创新投资成本系数都非常高时,分散化策略为最终的占优均衡策略.
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