管理者薪酬、薪酬绩效敏感性与公司非效率投资--基于动态面板System GMM模型的实证研究

摘要

In this paper, 716 listed companies range from 2002 to 2011 are used as our sample. We use the dynamic panel System GMM model,taking into account the three kinds of endogeneity at the same time, to study the relationship between managers salary, pay-performance sensitivity and corporate inefficient investment. And we find that, not only increasing managers salary and pay-performance sensitivity make a contribution to reducing corporate inefficient investment, but also the interaction effect between managers salary and pay-performance sensitivity has a significant effect on corporate inefficient investment. In terms of corporate inefficient investment, there is complementary effect between managers salary and pay-performance sensitivity.%以2002～2011年716家上市公司为样本，运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法，同时考虑了三种内生性，研究了管理者薪酬、薪酬绩效敏感性与公司非效率投资间的关系。通过研究发现，提高管理者薪酬及其薪酬绩效敏感性不仅有利于降低公司的非效率投资行为，而且管理者薪酬与其薪酬绩效敏感性间的交互效应也对公司非效率投资有显著的影响。在降低公司的非效率投资方面，管理者薪酬与其绩效敏感性间存在互补效应。