社会资本、法律保护与研发投资--来自中国上市公司面板数据的证据

摘要

对于公司研发投资的研究，现有研究一般从公司规模、公司年龄等内部因素，及地区经济发展、对外开放程度等外部因素展开的。本文引入社会学中的社会资本理论，结合法律保护状况，研究社会资本、法律保护程度对上市公司研发投资的影响。利用2007-2012年中国上市公司的不平衡面板数据，研究发现社会资本能够对公司研发投资产生正面的作用，它所规定的诚实、守信原则，作为一种非正式的、非强制的制度来规范个体的行为，刺激公司研发投资；法律保护也能对公司研发投资产生激励作用，随着法律保护水平的提高，公司研发投资水平相应增加。同时，社会资本和法律保护之间存在着替代作用，当法律保护增强时，社会资本对公司研发投资的正面作用减弱。此外，财务杠杆并不能制约公司的研发投资行为，这与传统代理理论不一致；现金流并没有成为公司研发投资的资金来源，这也不符合传统的融资约束理论。%Among the researches on corporate investing , much of them were made from the internal fac-tors of corporate size , corporate age , and the external factors of regional economic development and the level of opening-up.This paper introduces social capital theory from sociology , and with law protection , to analyze social capital and law protection impact on listed companies ’ R&D investment .Using unbalance panel data of Chinese listed companies in 2007-2012 , it finds that social capital , as an informal rule , can erect an positive effect on corporate R&D investment , which uses its honesty rule to stimulate corporate R&D investment; law protection also can cause more corporate R&D investment , as the law protection level increasing , more R&D investment were made in listed companies .Meanwhile , social capital and law protection can substitute with each other , with the law protection level increas , social capital positive effect on corporate R&D investment decreases.Besides, financial leverage can not restrain corporate R&D investment , which is not accordance with traditional agency theory .And the cash-flow does not finance corporate R&D investment , which is not in line with financial constraint theory .