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对赌协议:性质、风险及模型构建

     

摘要

Under the contradiction between financing difficulty and enterprises'urgent need for develop‐ment ,the valuation adjustment mechanism emerges .It not only solves the problem of information a‐symmetry between the financier and the investor well ,but also brings the investor abundant pay back .For the financier ,valuation adjustment mechanism is a kind of poison in most cases .Because the financier does not recognize the nature of valuation adjustment mechanism ,thus making the rights and obligations ,risk and return unequal .In view of the character of Protective Puts of the valuation adjustment mechanism ,this paper analyzes the risk of both trade sides ,constructs a new model of val‐uation adjustment mechanism about option premium ,and explores the pricing method of the share op‐tion and the valuation adjustment mechanism based on classical case analysis ,so as to improve the fairness and rationality of the mechanism in private equity financing .%在融资难和企业亟待进一步发展的矛盾下,对赌协议应运而生。它不仅较好地解决了融资方与投资方之间的信息不对称问题,更为投资者带来丰厚的利润回报。对于融资者而言,大多时候对赌协议如饮鸩止渴。究其原因,是融资方没有认清对赌协议的实质,使得契约的权利与义务、风险与收益不能对等。文章以对赌协议的保护性看跌期权性质为切入点,分析对赌双方的风险,建立关于期权费的新对赌模型,并结合经典对赌案例探析对赌协议期权费的定价方法及估值调整机制,以期使其在私募股权融资中的应用更加公平、合理。

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