首页> 中文期刊> 《工程管理学报》 >基于不同发起者的PPP项目再谈判博弈模型研究

基于不同发起者的PPP项目再谈判博弈模型研究

         

摘要

公私合营制(PPP)项目已成为政府提供基础设施的重要解决方案,而再谈判是目前PPP项目过程中最为常见的现象之一.梳理总结了PPP项目再谈判的原因,通过分析PPP项目再谈判过程,分别构建私营部门发起再谈判和公共部门发起再谈判的PPP项目讨价还价博弈模型,得出对应的子博弈精炼纳什均衡状态下双方的风险再分担比例,并据此提出深入了解再谈判发起者的动机,加大PPP项目建设运营期的监督力度,建立并完善法律体系和第三方仲裁,加强再谈判组织等建议,为PPP项目事后风险的治理提供了决策依据,促进PPP项目的良好发展.%Public-private partnership(PPP)project has become an important solution for governments to provide infrastructure, and renegotiation is currently one of the most common phenomenon in the process of the PPP project. This paper summarizes the reasons of PPP project renegotiations and builds two PPP project renegotiation bargaining game models of the private sector and public sector respectively through the analysis of the PPP project renegotiation process,drawing the conclusion of the risk proportion shared by each party according to corresponding sub-game refining Nash equilibrium,and on the basis of which,we propose to look into the motivation of the renegotiation initiators,intensify supervision of the PPP project operating period,establish and perfect the legal system and the third party arbitration and strengthen organization of renegotiations,which will provide a decision-making basis for the later risk of governance and promote the sound development of the PPP projects.

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