WiFi网络可以分担蜂窝网络的通信业务压力，缓解其拥塞状况。然而，WiFi网络的业务分担只能在其覆盖范围内进行。由于用户具有移动性，如果通过提供一些奖励引导WiFi网络覆盖范围之外的用户延迟其在蜂窝网络中的业务、直至其进入WiFi覆盖区再接受服务，WiFi网络的业务分担能力将得到显著提升。该文探讨了运营商通过激励机制鼓励用户延迟其蜂窝网络业务转而接入 WiFi 网络的过程，并将其建模为两阶段斯塔克博格(Stackelberg)博弈。在该博弈中，运营商期望采取最优的奖励方案，能够兼顾蜂窝网络拥塞和付出的用户奖励。该文推导出了运营商的最优奖励方案。数值结果表明，所提激励机制可以有效降低包括蜂窝网络拥塞代价和奖励用户代价在内的运营商总代价。%WiFi network helps offload the traffic pressure in cellular networks and alleviate its traffic congestion. However, it can merely offload the traffic within its coverage. In view of the mobility of users, if the users beyond WiFi coverage are incentivized with certain rewards to postpone their present cellular network services, and wait till they enter WiFi coverage, the traffic offloading capacity of WiFi Network will be significantly enhanced. This paper discusses an incentive mechanism for the operator to encourage users to delay their cellular network services and switch to WiFi network, and formulates the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In this game, an operator expects to adopt an optimum reward solution, giving considerations to the extent of cellular network congestion and the required reward for users. Optimal reward mechanisms for the operators are proposed. According to the research result, the proposed incentive mechanism can effectively reduce the total costs of operators including the cellular network congestion costs and the user reward costs.
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