首页> 中文期刊> 《土木工程与管理学报》 >不完全契约视角下PPP项目合作剩余分配的博弈分析

不完全契约视角下PPP项目合作剩余分配的博弈分析

         

摘要

PPP作为一种典型的项目融资模式,为基础设施建设和公共物品服务提供了一种新的思路,解决了公共部门资金匮乏和运营效率低等问题,并在世界各国得到了广泛推广和应用。然而PPP因自身的项目特点使其契约具有不完全性,在公私合作双方达成初始契约后的合作协商阶段,初始契约中未明确规定的事项通过双方协商合作,可以获得初始契约中未涉及的合作剩余收益。针对该部分合作剩余收益,合作双方对分配份额进行谈判,考虑合作双方地位的非对称性以及信息不对称性,建立不完全信息动态博弈模型,求解精炼纳什均衡解,分析影响分配结果的因素,得出博弈方的信息类型对博弈结果影响最为显著,从而为PPP项目合作剩余分配谈判提供了有益参考。%As a typical project financing model, PPP provides a new way for infrastructure and public goods services and addresses the problems of lack of fund and low operational efficiency for the public sector, and it has been widely promoted and adopted in the world. PPP projects’ contract is incomplete because of its own characteristics. Both sides in the contract get the cooperative surplus from the cooperation on the unclear defined matters by the initial contract. For the interest allocation of this part, they negotiate on the share. Considering the asymmetry of participants’ status, an incomplete information game model is formed on this basis, and the perfect Nash equilibrium is found. Finally, through the analysis of the factors in the allocation, the type of the player has the most significant impact on the final result. And then a helpful reference can be provided for the allocation of the residual interest in PPP projects.

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