论类型化视角下体外胚胎之法律属性

摘要

External embryo differs from person to person and is not equal to things, which becomes the biggest challenge to dichotomy system of person and things. The legislation in China does not involve the legal attribute of external embryo, and the standpoints in domestic academia and court are divergent. All of these reflect that it is difficult to define the legal attribute of external embryo. In face of multipurposed external embryos and growing pluralistic cases, single legal attribute can not reach complete coverage, and each of the subject doctrine, the object doctrine and the resonance doctrine has its defects. In view of this, we can, on the basis of person-thing transformation and the purpose of separation, convert perspectives, taking, say, the perspective of typisierung to differiantiate the storage purpose of embryo or to analyze whether the donor of embryo is alive so as to treat the legal attribute of external embyo in respective ways.%体外胚胎区别于人，又无法等同于物，已成为对传统人、物二分格局的最大挑战。对体外胚胎之法律属性，我国立法并未涉及，国内学界众说纷纭，在个案审理中法院之观点也各有不同，由此折射出其定性之困。面对用途各异之体外胚胎和日益多元化之个案情形，单一的法律属性无法全面覆盖，无论是主体说、客体说，抑或中介说均有所缺憾。对此，可以类型化分析为视角，以人、物转化说与分离目的说为基础，区分胚胎存放之目的以及胚胎供体是否存活，对体外胚胎之法律属性予以区别对待。