完全信息下可修M/M/1排队系统的均衡分析

摘要

研究可修M/M/1排队系统的均衡策略.顾客到达系统后可以观察到系统的队长和服务台的状态(工作或处于修理状态),根据这些系统状态、排队等待费用及完成服务后的回报报酬等信息,顾客将决定是否加入到系统中.本文在修理时间服从k阶Erlang分布的假设下得到了顾客选择进入排队系统的均衡阈值.%An equilibrium threshold balking strategy is investigated for a fully observable M/M/1 queue. After they arrive system, the customers can observe the queue length and the status of server (working or under repair) and decide whether to join or balk the queue based on system states, waiting cost and the reward for their services. We derive an equilibrium threshold balking strategy for the system with Erlangian repair time of order k.