考虑需求相互转移的卖方消费信贷协调契约

摘要

To study the rate pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of a single retailer and bank in the seller′s consumption credit on the condition that mutual shifts exist between credit consumption demand and cash consumption demand, Stackelberg game and revenue sharing contract research method are used, and decentralized decision-making model, centralized decision-making model and revenue sharing contract model are established.Conclusions are drawn: as demand loss coefficient rises, the bank′s rate and the retailer′s fee subsidy rise as well, while the fee rate paid by consumers falls;when retailer shares all the consumption credit revenue with the bank, Revenue sharing contract can achieve coordination of credit consumption system, but to achieve the perfect win-win coordination of the system, the bank needs to share part of the profit further with retailer.The simulation result shows that compared with decentralized decision-making and on the revenue sharing contract, the retailer′s profit reduces by 254.475 4, while the bank′s profit increases by 508.950 9.As the overall profit of the system increases by 254.475 4, the sys-tem benefits improve by 25.56%.%为了研究在信贷消费需求与现款消费需求之间存在相互转移的条件下,卖方消费信贷中单个零售商和单个银行的利费率制定策略和协调机制,运用了主从博弈理论和供应链协调中收益共享契约的研究方法,建立了由银行主导的分散决策模型、集中决策模型及收益共享契约模型. 得出结论:随着需求流失系数的增大,银行制定的利费率和零售商提供的利费补贴同时随之增大,而信贷消费者实际支付的利费率随之减小;当零售商将其全部的信贷消费收益分享给银行时,收益共享契约可实现信贷消费系统的协调,但为了实现系统的完美共赢协调,需要银行进一步将协调后的部分利润分享给零售商. 仿真结果表明:与分散决策相比,收益共享协调契约下,零售商的利润减少254.475 4,而银行的利润增加508.950 9,系统的整体利润增加254.475 4,系统效益提高了25.56%.