我国银行间ATM跨行取款收费的竞争行为研究——基于Hoteling模型的分析

摘要

本文以Hoteling模型为基础，基于中国ATM的跨行取款收费制来构造数理模型，分析了我国各大银行ATM跨行取款收费制的决定性因素以及银行的竞争行为。研究结果表明，客户群内生时各大银行对跨行取款收费要低于客户群外生时的跨行取款收费。客户群外生情形下，大小银行的跨行费的制定存在差异，规模较大银行为了锁定本行的客户的跨行取款行为，倾向于收取更高的跨行费，锁定效应明显；中小银行通过收取较低的跨行费或免费的方式，利用大银行的ATM网络优势来吸引新客户，但这会导致小银行补贴大银行现象。如果我国银行的客户量的变化是外生的，那么中小银行则处于一种不利的竞争地位，大银行凭借ATM的网络优势会获取更多利润，导致利润进一步向大银行集中；而当客户内生时，大银行收取较高的跨行费将会失去部分潜在的客户量，中小银行则会处于有利的竞争地位，其竞争环境会由此得到改善。%In this paper, in order to discover the reason behind the inter- banking＇s ATM withdrawals pricing , we based on hoteling model and Chinese inter- bank ATM foreign fees fact to construct our mathematical model. The results show that under the foreign fees system, the fees charged under the customer en- dogenous will be lower than the fees charged under the customer exogenous. The large bank will prefer to rise foreign fees, and the small bank not, or even for free their banking＇s customer interbank withdrawals. This will make the small bank even disadvantage position when under the customer exogenous situation. Because big bank can lock their large customers scale from interbank withdrawals and lower its cost. But when a customer is endogenous then the small and medium banks will be in a favorable competitive position.