长期合作关系中惩罚机制的演化博弈分析

摘要

In the public cultural PPP project management,establishing long-term cooperative partnership between construction unit and contractor will help reduce the cost of trust and acquire long-term gains.But some contractors take opportunistic be-havior by using information superiority for the pursuit of excess earnings and undermine the long-term cooperation condition. So,construction unit should take certain management tools to inhibit contractors’opportunistic behaviors.The inhibitory effect and necessity of the punishment mechanism for opportunistic behavior are investigated by establishing evolutionary game model and analyzing evolution path of the contractors’opportunistic behaviors in the long-term cooperation condition.The re-sults show that punishment mechanism does not play significant inhibitory role on the opportunistic behavior of the contractor under the condition of establishing long-term cooperative partnership in public cultural PPP projects.Based on this,construc-tion unit should fully communicate with the contractors to establish integrity and cooperation platform,and try to improve the potential long-term cooperative revenue through a variety of ways to achieve mutual benefit.%在公共文化 PPP 项目管理中，建设单位和承包商建立长期合作伙伴关系有助于降低信任成本，获得长期收益；但不排除承包商为追求超额收益，运用信息优势采取机会主义行为，破坏长期合作状态。因此，建设单位需采取一定的管理手段来抑制承包商的机会主义行为。运用演化博弈理论建立模型，分析承包商机会主义的演化路径，探讨在长期合作状态下，惩罚机制对承包商机会主义行为的抑制效果及其建立的必要性。结果表明，公共文化 PPP 项目中，在双方建立长期合作关系的前提下，惩罚机制对承包商的机会主义行为并未起到较为显著的抑制效果。基于此，建设单位应与承包商进行充分沟通，建立诚信合作平台，并通过多种途径提高承包商的长期合作潜在收益值，实现互利共赢。