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食品安全问题中的政府监管失灵研究--以寻租为例

     

摘要

It has found that there has been low efficiency and government failure in government regulation after the research of government regulation of China's food safety problems. Then it takes rent-seeking as an example to build the game model and makes the analysis to find that,as long as the rent-seeking cost is less than the penalty cost,food producers are likely to seek rent from regulators. Therefore,government regulation behavior itself must be supervised by publics to solve problems of food safety better.%对我国食品安全问题的政府监管进行研究,认为政府监管也存在效率不高和政府失灵的问题,然后以寻租为例建立博弈模型进行分析,发现只要寻租成本低于处罚成本,食品生产者就有可能向监管者寻租,因此政府监管行为本身也要受到社会监督,才能更好地解决食品安全问题。

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