奖惩机制下的再制造闭环供应链协调

摘要

为了提高闭环供应链管理的效率,构建了奖惩机制下由单一制造商、单一零售商和第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链博弈模型.在集中决策下,研究了奖惩机制下“超组织”的最优决策和利润,并给出了均衡解存在的条件和奖惩力度需满足的范围.在分散化决策下研究了闭环供应链成员企业的批发价、零售价、回收补贴价和回收率决策,分析了奖惩力度和最低回收率对节点企业决策和利润的影响.研究了奖惩机制下再制造闭环供应链的协调机制,并讨论了奖惩力度和最低回收率对协调后的闭环供应链系统的影响.%To improve efficiency of closed-loop supply chain management, game model for closed-loop supply chain consisting of single manufacturer, single retailer and a third-party collector was constructed. In the circumstance of the centralized decision making, the optimal decision and profits of super organization under premium and penalty mechanism were studied, and the conditions for equilibrium solution and the range of premium and penalty were presented. In the circumstance of decentralized decision making, wholesale price, retail price, return subsidy price and return rate decision for membership enterprises of closed-loop supply chain were studied, and the impact of the premium and penalty range as well as lowest return rate on node enterprises' decisions and profits were also analyzed. Coordination of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under premium and penalty mechanism was also researched, and the impact of the premium and penalty and the minimum return rate on the closed-loop supply chain after coordination was discussed.