Taking Town Qiao as an example, this paper employs the analytic triarchical relational framework of the state, local government, and peasants to explain the practical logic and realistic dilemma of the accountability system in the petition governance at the rural grassroots. My study has discovered that, although the accountability system may strengthen the responsibility awareness of the cadres and solve the problem in the petition governance to some extent, three contradictions between the monitoring environment and the spatial separation, the monitoring techniques and the social basis, the monitoring intensity and the ethical pressure have pushed this system into a dilemma, which have produced more and more goal-displacement behaviors that deviate from the original intention of this system. The implementation of the accountability system reflects the state power penetrating rural society. The inefficiency of the accountability power when it enters rural society strengthening the one-on-one accountability System. It is very system indicates the dilemma of the state The state power tries to achieve the goal of monitoring of the petitioners via the difficult for the state to control the scattered petitioners in a rural society on the move; on the other hand, the petitioners can effectively evade the discipline of the state and occupy the driving position when they are dealing with the rural grassroots agents. On this basis, this article explains three paradoxes in the operation of the Chinese bureaucracy - rational bureaucracy and irrational operation, specialization and synthesis, routine operation and unconventional tasks. The article also gives a theoretical explanation for them. This study emphasizes that the long-standing and widespread paradox of name-reality separation in the Chinese grassroots power operation is not only the result of the game of all actors in the bureaucracy or a problem of organizational excitation, but also is birthed by bureaucracy combined with rural society. Thus, we should not only limit to the institutional construction level but we also must consider whether the social basis and institutional environment exist to support a modern government at the grassroots.%本文以桥镇为个案，运用国家、基层政权和农民博弈关系的三层分析框架，阐释了乡村基层信访治理中“包保责任制”的实践逻辑和现实困境。研究发现，尽管“包保责任制”能够强化包保责任人的责任意识，并在一定程度上缓解信访治理工作难题，但监控环境与空间隔离、监控技术与社会基础、监控强度与道义压力这三大矛盾使得这一制度的运行陷入困境，滋生了越来越多与制度设计初衷相悖的“目标替代”行为。在此基础上，本文阐释了中国科层制运作的三大矛盾，即理性科层制与非理性运作的矛盾、专业化与综合性的矛盾、常规运作与非常规任务的矛盾，并给出了相应的理论解释。本研究强调，在中国基层权力运作中，长期而广泛存在的名实分离的矛盾现象，不仅仅是科层体制内部各行动主体博弈的结果，也不纯粹是一个组织激励问题，而是由科层体制与乡村社会的合力所催生。由此，在推进基层政权现代化建设进程中，就不能局限于制度建设层面，还要考虑是否具备支撑现代基层政权的社会基础和制度环境。
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