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企业新进员工培训决策的博弈分析

         

摘要

在企业新进员工的培训决策中,双方行动策略的结果直接影响着双方期望收益的大小,在这种情况下,企业新进员工培训决策的博弈分析就显得很有必要。通过对企业和新进员工之间在三个阶段的博弈分析,只有当企业选择培训,而新进员工在受训后能力见长而选择留任原企业时,企业和受训后的新进员工的期望收益同时达到最大。新进员工在经过系统的培训后其市场价值相对过去已得到大幅度提升,自然希望得到比接受培训前的更多的收益。企业可以采取增加新进员工受训后的期望收益,增加新进员工受训后的离职成本,留住受训后的新进员工。%  In the decision making of new staff training,the action strategies of both sides directly affect their expected benefits. In this case,game analysis of decision making on new staff training seems necessary. The game analysis between an enterprise and the new em-ployees in three phases shows only when the enterprise chooses to train the new staff and the new employees' abilities are improved after the training and choose to remain in the enterprise,both sides can reach the maximum expected benefits at the same time. The market value of new employees rises substantially after the training,so they might naturally hope to obtain more income than before. Enterprises could retain the new staff by increasing their income and the leaving-office cost after the training.

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