The ground work for Kant's metaphysics of experience: An essay on the transcendental deduction's contribution to the analytic of principles in the 'Critique of Pure Reason'.

摘要

In my dissertation I elucidate the relationship, often neglected, between the Transcendental Deduction and the Principles of Pure Understanding in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that the Transcendental Deduction provides important groundwork on which the arguments of the Principles rest.;I defend the claim that the Deduction provides this groundwork in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, I begin to articulate the nature of the grounding relationship. If one considers the arguments of the Principles in isolation from the earlier sections of the Critique, they seem far from establishing their conclusions. They establish at best how the world must appear to us, not how it is. The Transcendental Deduction, I argue, is part of the answer to how Kant draws the stronger conclusion.;The other part is a proper understanding of transcendental idealism. In Chapter 3, I consider two major schools of interpretation of transcendental idealism and defend a hybrid. The upshot of this analysis is that in order for Kant to appeal to transcendental idealism to establish that the objective world---the world of appearances---is as the theses of the Principles say, he must establish that the properties picked out by these principles appear to us in experience and are not properties that we merely attribute to the world. The Transcendental Deduction is supposed to show that these properties---"categorial" properties---do so appear.;I argue in Chapter 4 that the Transcendental Deduction contributes in a second way. Kant holds what I call his "principle of sense." If categorial properties cannot appear to us, then according to the principle of sense, the theses of the Principles will lack "sense and significance." By showing, in the Deduction, that categorial properties appear to us, Kant shows that the categories pass the principle of sense.;I conclude my dissertation in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I elucidate the argument of the Transcendental Deduction to show that the goals that I attribute to it really are its goals. Additionally, I argue that my analysis answers the problem of the so-called "proof structure" of the B-Deduction and that Kant's synthesis of the imagination is not properly said to operate under the "guidance" of concepts.