首页> 外文学位 >Economic Impacts of the Labor Intensive Works Program in Yemen
【24h】

Economic Impacts of the Labor Intensive Works Program in Yemen

机译:也门劳动密集型计划的经济影响

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

This dissertation examines the impacts and functioning of a community led public works intervention in Yemen, the Labor Intensive Public Works Program (LIWP). LIWP was designed using the "twin-track" approach of combining short-term relief with long-term investments. The program transfers funds to poor rural households by creating temporary employment opportunities in projects that benefit the local community. Income from program wages provides short term protection against negative consumption shocks, while the public works projects themselves provide medium to long term benefits for the community. The first chapter describes an unexpected effect of the intervention on decreasing local prices and explains how this effect can occur as a result of the existing informal institution of store credit in rural communities. The second chapter examines heterogeneity in program impacts related to the type of project chosen by the community and the correlates of this choice. The third chapter provides a detailed evaluation of the impact of the LIWP intervention on households in communities where projects took place.;In Chapter 1, I show the surprising empirical finding that in villages with random assignment to participate in LIWP, the price of staple goods in local stores rose less over time, and connect this to the institution of store credit in isolated villages. I find that there is an increase in prices in communities with 5 or more stores, and a significant relative decline of about 10% in villages with 4 or fewer stores. I develop a simple model of credit as insurance based on qualitative interviews in the field which shows that villagers are willing to pay a premium to local store owners over a more distant and anonymous market because their local store owner can be relied on to let them buy on credit in the future. In this way, the cost of zero-interest credit is internalized in prices charged, however this informal contract is only sustainable if there are sufficient dynamic incentives, which will be more likely in less competitive markets, consistent with the empirical findings.;In Chapter 2, which is based on joint work with Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet, we examine the choice of project by communities in the LIWP intervention. While LIWP was designed with the short-term purpose of providing cash for work to underemployed villagers, the community as a whole decided on the type public infrastructure to be constructed using the labor paid for by LIWP. We characterize the various projects in terms of skill intensity based on administrative data about relative pay receipts to unskilled and skilled workers and show that the skill-intensity of project choice is correlated with demographic features of the village which imply greater political power for older men. This result indicates that the choice of projects by the community is influenced by the relative distribution of benefits. To identify the channel at play, we show that in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 economic and political crisis in Yemen, there was a higher preference for skill-intensive projects. This is consistent with a model in which older, skilled men who prior to the crisis would not have self-selected as participants in the LIWP program due to the relatively low wages paid compared to alternative employment options, became potential participants due to the crisis. As a consequence, they pushed for skilled labor-intensive projects in which they could capture a larger share of the benefits.;In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Daniel Egel, we use a randomized control trial to measure improvements in household welfare brought about by the program intervention. We find positive program impacts on household income and durable good ownership, reflecting the short term benefits of wages from work in the LIWP project. We also find surprisingly large program effects on decreasing the average outstanding debt. By analyzing the calorie content of staple grains consumed per person, we find a program impact equivalent to 11-13% higher calorie consumption in treated compared to untreated communities. We also summarize community perceptions of the project benefits and find that completed water related projects reduced water scarcity and fetching time.
机译:本文研究了劳动密集型公共工程计划(LIWP)在也门的社区主导的公共工程干预的影响和功能。 LIWP是使用“双轨”方法设计的,该方法将短期救济与长期投资相结合。该计划通过在有利于当地社区的项目中创造临时就业机会,将资金转移到了贫困的农村家庭。从计划工资中获得的收入可提供短期保护,以防止负面的消费冲击,而公共工程项目本身可为社区提供中长期收益。第一章描述了干预措施对降低本地价格的意想不到的效果,并说明了由于农村社区现有的非正式商店信贷制度而可能产生的效果。第二章探讨了与社区选择的项目类型相关的项目影响的异质性以及该选择的相关性。第三章详细评估了LIWP干预对项目所在社区的家庭的影响。在第一章中,我展示了令人惊讶的经验发现,在随机分配参加LIWP的村庄中,大宗商品的价格随着时间的流逝,当地商店的零售额增长速度会降低,这与偏远村庄的商店信用制度联系起来。我发现,拥有5家或5家以上商店的社区的价格都有所上涨,而拥有4家或4家以下商店的村庄的价格却相对下降了10%。我根据实地定性访谈开发了一种简单的信用保险模型,该模型表明村民愿意在更远和更匿名的市场上向本地商店所有者支付溢价,因为可以依靠他们的本地商店所有者来让他们购买在未来的信用。这样,零利率信贷的成本就可以在价格中内部化,但是这种非正式合同只有在有足够的动力激励的情况下才是可持续的,这与经验发现一致。图2基于与Alain de Janvry和Elisabeth Sadoulet的联合工作,我们研究了LIWP干预中社区对项目的选择。 LIWP的设计目的是短期为向就业不足的村民提供现金,但社区整体上决定使用LIWP支付的劳动力来建设的公共基础设施类型。我们根据有关非熟练和熟练工人的相对工资收入的行政数据,根据技能强度来表征各种项目,并表明项目选择的技能强度与村庄的人口特征相关,这意味着老年人的政治权力更大。结果表明,社区对项目的选择受利益相对分配的影响。为了确定发挥作用的渠道,我们表明,在也门2011年经济和政治危机之后,对技能密集型项目的偏好更高。这与一个模型相一致,在该模型中,由于支付的工资相对于替代性就业选择而言相对较低,因此在危机之前不会被older选为LIWP计划参与者的年长,技术熟练的男性成为危机的潜在参与者。结果,他们推动了熟练的劳动密集型项目,在这些项目中他们可以获取更大的收益。在第3章(基于与Alain de Janvry,Elisabeth Sadoulet和Daniel Egel的合作基础上),我们使用了随机对照试验,以评估计划干预带来的家庭福利改善情况。我们发现该计划对家庭收入和持久拥有所有权产生了积极影响,反映了LIWP项目中工作带来的短期工资收益。我们还发现令人惊讶的是,该计划对减少平均未偿债务有巨大的影响。通过分析每人食用的五谷杂粮的卡路里含量,我们发现与未治疗的社区相比,该计划的影响相当于已处理的卡路里摄入量增加11-13%。我们还总结了社区对项目收益的看法,并发现与水相关的已完成项目减少了水资源短缺和取水时间。

著录项

  • 作者

    Christian, Sikandra Smith.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Berkeley.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Berkeley.;
  • 学科 Economics.;South Asian studies.;Labor economics.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 138 p.
  • 总页数 138
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:52:37

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号