Regulation of international energy markets: Economic effects of political actions.

摘要

Recent increases in volatility of energy prices have led many governments to reevaluate their regard of national energy reserves and reconsider future exploration, production, and consumption patterns. The flurry of activity that has been generated by such price volatility has included large-scale nationalizations of energy sectors, unilateral renegotiations of foreign energy development contracts, and expropriations of resources from foreign energy firms on one hand, and on the other hand more rapid energy sector liberalization, intensified search for and development of renewable fuels and technologies, and development of incentives for increased energy efficiency and conservation. The aim of this dissertation is to examine and quantify the extent of positive and negative effects that have resulted from some of these activities.The first chapter focuses on quantifying the effect that nationalistic sentiment has had on economic attractiveness of energy sectors during the decade prior to the recent global economic crisis, as measured by foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Empirical results demonstrate that both political and economic conditions play an important role in investors' decisions. A combination of investment friendliness, corruption levels, and democracy all help to explain the trends in energy-sector investment levels over time in my sample countries, although differences in the types of corruption existing in these nations do not. Investment levels, in turn, appear to influence future levels of oil production, underscoring the significance of good investment policies for future success of energy sectors.Chapter two considers the response of energy stock prices to severe regulatory actions. It employs an event study framework to examine causal effects of critical informational announcements (i.e. events of expropriation and nationalization) on daily returns and cumulative losses in firm value of energy corporations. Results show that a firm's participation in a regulated market results in an average decline in its stock returns of up to 50 basis points per day, and a cumulative loss of more than 3.5% of its market value. Negative shocks to securities returns persist for at least two months. Participation in a regulated market, however, is not always unfavorable, as involved firms not directly targeted by regulatory action appear to gain sizable risk premiums. Additional evidence suggests that, although there is no direct linear relationship between firm size and effect magnitude, large firms tend to be hurt more in the short term, while small firms suffer bigger declines in returns over a longer time period.The last chapter turns to global electricity sectors to examine the development of Demand Response (DR) programs, which have become popular means of addressing the sector's central market failure of pricing below marginal generation cost. DR programs incorporate demand signals into retail electricity rates, and have the potential to effectively and inexpensively improve grid reliability and increase end-use efficiency. However, DR faces many challenges, arguably the most important of which is a general lack of information among consumers regarding usage levels and existence of alternative providers and rate plans. Financial considerations, lack of access to technological infrastructure, and misaligned producer incentives also play an important role in DR's limited success.