A defense of Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of the virtues.

摘要

An important question for any virtue ethics theory is, assuming there is more than one moral virtue, how do the various moral virtues fit together? Do they fit together in any systematic way, or are they only loosely and contingently connected to each other?; In Nicomachean Ethics VI 12-13 Aristotle provides his answer to this important question. He argues that phronesis (often translated as 'practical wisdom') requires the moral virtues and the moral virtues require phronesis (cf. 1144 b 30-32), This doctrine, commonly known as the unity of the virtues, has been subjected to much criticism by recent philosophers. Phillipa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre reject the doctrine because they believe that moral virtues may be used for wicked ends and so do not require phronesis. Peter Geach rejects the doctrine because he believes that a person may possess a moral virtue in one area but a vice in another area. Richard Kraut and Elizabeth Telfer reject the doctrine because they believe that a person may be virtuous in one area but merely continent in another area. Finally, Terence Irwin rejects the doctrine because he believes it requires encyclopedic knowledge of the phronimos and is inconsistent with Aristotle's claims that generosity, magnificence, proper pride, and magnanimity are distinct virtues and a person may possess the "small-scale" virtues of generosity and proper pride without possessing the corresponding "large-scale" virtues of magnificence and magnanimity.; In my dissertation I defend Aristotle's doctrine against these objections. In my first chapter I sketch the rationale behind Aristotle's doctrine and the reasons why these recent philosophers reject it. I begin my defense with a consideration of Aristotle's account of happiness in chapter two. In chapter three I consider Aristotle's account of moral virtue. I examine his account of phronesis in chapter four and his accounts of the particular moral virtues in chapter five. Finally, in chapter six, I provide an extensive discussion of Aristotle's arguments for the unity of the virtues doctrine and then respond to the objections recent philosophers have raised against this doctrine.