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The international political economy of United States research and development policy.

机译:美国的国际政治经济学研究与发展政策。

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摘要

This research constructs a political economic model of federal government funding of private sector research and development (R&D). Specifically, this dissertation asks what accounts for changes in funding by the federal government and what accounts for how that money is distributed. In order to accomplish this, Neorealist explanations of R&D policy are compared to a domestic political economy model. The former argues international security competition motivates R&D funding. The latter explains changing patterns in R&D funding using electoral and business cycle variables as well as the international trade balances of the industries being funded. Two methodological approaches are used to investigate these issues. First, quantitative analysis uses OLS regression models to identify the political and economic determinants of US Government R&D spending. Second, a case study is conducted of the efforts to create a centralized R&D policy in the United States after WW II. Specifically, the role of the government and the scientific community to forge a coherent framework for the conduct of a national science and technology policy is studied. While there were several attempts to centralize the responsibility for R&D, these attempts were thwarted by bureaucratic organizations (such as the individual armed services) which saw centralization as a threat to their own scientific prerogatives. This research chronicles and analyzes this tension throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.;The quantitative results indicate that American R&D funding levels are not influenced by systemic factors, but are influenced by domestic political and economic variables. In addition to trade balances for particular industries, business and election cycle variables tend to influence R&D funding by the government. While this pattern is not consistent across all industries, it does manifest itself in several important industrial sectors, including petroleum extraction, electronics and communication equipment, and the aerospace industry.
机译:这项研究构建了联邦政府对私营部门研究与开发(R&D)进行资助的政治经济学模型。具体来说,本论文将询问哪些因素导致了联邦政府对资金的变化以及哪些因素导致了这笔钱的分配。为此,将新现实主义对研发政策的解释与国内政治经济学模型进行了比较。前者认为,国际安全竞争会激励研发资金。后者解释了使用选举和商业周期变量以及所资助行业的国际贸易差额来改变研发资金的方式。两种方法学方法用于调查这些问题。首先,定量分析使用OLS回归模型来确定美国政府研发支出的政治和经济决定因素。其次,对第二次世界大战后在美国建立集中式研发政策的工作进行了案例研究。具体来说,研究了政府和科学界为制定国家科学技术政策制定连贯框架的作用。尽管有几次尝试将研发责任集中化,但这些尝试遭到官僚组织(例如单个武装部门)的阻挠,他们将集中化视为对其自身科学特权的威胁。这项研究记述并分析了整个1940年代末期和1950年代末的这种紧张关系。除了特定行业的贸易平衡外,商业和选举周期变量还倾向于影响政府的研发资金。尽管这种模式在所有行业中并不一致,但在石油开采,电子和通信设备以及航空航天业等几个重要工业部门中确实表现出来。

著录项

  • 作者

    Gordon, Jonathan.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.;

  • 授予单位 The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.;
  • 学科 Political science.;International law.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1996
  • 页码 209 p.
  • 总页数 209
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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