This dissertation explores US foreign aid policymaking utilizing methods and theories that are commonly employed to explain domestic public policymaking. This approach facilitates the understanding of foreign aid policymaking by examining it as a sequential (linear), step-by-step process. The work features a case study of US involvement in the unexploded ordnance problem in Lao PDR and advances several conclusions. They are: (1) multiple levels of advocacy and the employment of political symbols play a role in both the formulation and implementation of foreign aid policymaking; (2) foreign aid policymakers are increasingly using non-governmental organizations, commonly referred to by the acronym NGOs; and (3) these NGOs exhibit high degrees of regional expertise and efficiency, and in some cases, accord policymakers political cover by acting as go-betweens or proxies for various foreign aid actors. Moreover, increased governmental reliance accords NGOs them a level of autonomy that allows them to exert influence over the policy and programs they implement.; The unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Laos is a tragic legacy of the US involvement in the Indochinese conflict. Both the US and Laotian governments have been slow to address the problems caused by the inadvertent detonation of UXO, resulting in over 200 accidents per year, nearly half of which are fatal. The US government is currently underwriting two UXO-related programs in Laos. The first is a medical capacity-building program administered by the Agency for International Development, and implemented by an NGO. The second is an ordnance-clearing training program administered by the Department of State through the US Embassy in Laos, and implemented by the US Department of Defense.; The focus of this treatise explores how these programs were formulated, adopted and ultimately implemented. The conclusions that are offered have resulted from a somewhat unconventional, yet richly satisfying methodological pursuit.
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