Skepticism and practical reasoning in Hume's ethical theory.

摘要

Interpretations of Hume have tended to fall into two main categories: skepticism and anti-skepticism about the instrumental theory of practical reason.;Many Hume scholars have recently fought to exonerate him from the seemingly implausible implications of his skepticism about instrumental reason by demonstrating that the views which critics attribute to Hume are not really his; and that, on the contrary, Hume does not reject the theory of practical reasoning and the objectivity of values. Hume's supporters have maintained that because Hume endorses the instrumental conception of practical reasoning, he is not a skeptic with respect to morality. It appears to be a tacit assumption of both the defenders and the opponents that if Hume does not have a theory of instrumental reasoning, then he is a skeptic about morality, and vice versa.;My approach will be to avoid both of these two extremes by trying to reconstruct Hume's argument in such a way that his skepticism about practical reasoning and his ethical theory are not mutually exclusive. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).