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Cognitive theory of war: Why do weak states choose war against stronger states?

机译:战争的认知理论:为什么弱国选择对强国进行战争?

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摘要

The key question to be addressed in this paper is why weaker states with a slight chance of winning do not avoid war against stronger states. Even though most war theory does offer a few insights about the conditions under which weak states choose war when there is only a slight possibility of winning, explanations based on either emphasis on rationality or ignorance of "interacting structure" of international relations leave many practical remedies unexplained. This paper explains asymmetric conflict on the combination of Prospect theory and Game theory. The interacting game structure of asymmetric conflicts can be summarized. Under the threat of massive retaliation by a strong state, a weak state is forced to choose between war (defection) and withdrawal (cooperation). In asymmetric conflicts, defection (war against a strong state with a slight chance of winning) is a risky gamble, and cooperation is safe choice. In contrast to Expected Utility theory, this paper argues that weak states in a loss frame chooses risky war (defection) against a superior adversary in the hope of recovering from their crisis.; This paper follows crisis analyses of other Prospect theorists. The nature and seriousness of the crisis of a weak state are analyzed. The rare occurrence and deviant characteristics of a weak state's war choice make it suitable to use a qualitative structured analysis. The research hypothesis is applied to three case studies: the Gulf War between Iraq and the United States-led alliance in 1990, the Falkland/Malvinas Island war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, and the Middle East War between Egypt and Israel in 1973. The implication of this study is that enforcing strategy based on superior capability is not a reasonable means to prevent a weak state in a loss frame from choosing war against superior adversary.
机译:本文要解决的关键问题是,为什么有机会获胜的实力较弱的国家不能避免与实力较强的国家进行战争。尽管大多数战争理论确实提供了一些关于弱国在只有很小的获胜可能性时选择战争的条件的见解,但基于强调合理性或对国际关系“相互作用结构”的无知的解释仍然有许多实际的补救措施无法解释。本文解释了前景理论和博弈论相结合的非对称冲突。不对称冲突的互动博弈结构可以概括。在强国进行大规模报复的威胁下,弱国被迫在战争(叛逃)和撤军(合作)之间做出选择。在不对称的冲突中,叛逃(与强国进行战争,极有可能获胜)是冒险的赌博,而合作是安全的选择。与预期效用理论相反,本文认为,处于损失框架中的软弱国家会选择针对上级对手的冒险战争(叛逃),以期从危机中恢复过来。本文遵循其他前景理论家的危机分析。分析了弱国危机的性质和严重性。弱国战争选择的罕见发生和异常特征使其适合使用定性结构分析。该研究假设适用于三个案例研究:1990年伊拉克与美国领导的联盟之间的海湾战争,1982年阿根廷与英国之间的福克兰/马尔维纳斯岛战争以及埃及与以色列之间的中东战争。 1973年。这项研究的含意是,基于卓越能力的执行策略不是防止损失框架中的弱势国家选择对抗卓越对手的战争的合理手段。

著录项

  • 作者

    Park, Sang-Hyun.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Tennessee.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Tennessee.;
  • 学科 Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2004
  • 页码 216 p.
  • 总页数 216
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 国际法;
  • 关键词

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