Wish, deliberation, and action: A study of Aristotle's moral psychology.

摘要

This thesis explores Aristotle's conception of practical reason through examining his discussion of ‘wish []’ and ‘deliberation []’. In chapter 1, which focuses on Aristotle's claim that all wishes are directed at ‘acting well []’, I argue that this claim indicates that wish, unlike nonrational desires, involves the agent's reflective endorsement of an initial desirable and thus demonstrates a double aspect structure of human motivation. In chapter 2, which concerns Aristotle's view of the relationship between wish and the nonrational states of the soul, I refute the view that the desiderative drive involved in a wish originates entirely from the nonrational part of the soul. For Aristotle, I argue, both the rational and nonrational parts of the soul are independent sources of motivation, and while the latter presents the initial desirables, it is the former that, using them as basic data, finally determines the object of wish. In chapter 3, which explores Aristotle's distinction between action and production, especially the sense in which the end of action is not ‘distinct []’ from action itself, I argue that the point of the non-distinctness is that under every purposive action lies the agent's ultimate concern to respond appropriately to the practically relevant features of the given situation. In chapter 4, which concentrates on the relationship between the practically wise person's capacity to find out the best means and his perceptual capacity, I argue that this perceptual capacity concerns the particularity of the given situation, not of the subject of his final practical judgment, and that this capacity essentially concerns what should be done as opposed to what is there. In chapter 5, which is concerned with the practically wise person's knowledge of the end, I defend the view that this knowledge consists in possessing a set of appropriate settled dispositions towards specific objects and concerns, against the view that it consists in a comprehensive, articulate conception of the good life. I also argue that in accepting the first view, we should take the stage where a narrow practical end is set to be already part of the process of practical deliberation.