首页> 外文学位 >Essays on the Political Economy of Social Government Programs.
【24h】

Essays on the Political Economy of Social Government Programs.

机译:关于社会政府计划的政治经济学论文。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

This dissertation is an effort to deepen our understanding about how citizens assign credit for changes in their personal economic situation and how they evaluate political processes and outcomes when exposed to targeted government transfers. This dissertation consists of three chapters that study the electoral effects of social government programs and their impact on citizens' attitudes.;The first chapter entitled "Local Electoral Rewards from Centralized Social Programs: Are Mayors Getting the Credit?" provides an empirical assessment of the extent to which local incumbents are rewarded for welfare programs under the control and operation of a central government. I use variation in the timing of the Mexican antipoverty program's introduction across municipalities to identify its impact on the share of votes for the local incumbent party. I find evidence that voters credit the Mayor's party from the benefit to their constituencies. The estimated effect is significantly positive accounting on average for 2.8 percentage points in the share of votes for the Mayor's party. The analysis of party alignment shows that this electoral effect cannot be explained as a reward for the federal incumbent in local elections. I examine alternative explanations and show that the effect for the local incumbent is heterogeneous for the different political parties and varies with characteristics of the municipalities, being stronger where the Mayor faced more contestable elections, in capital cities of the States and in predominantly urban, more educated and relatively wealthier municipalities. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that politicians have incentives to engage in signaling strategies to link themselves to the transfer program.;The second chapter entitled "Voters Response to Natural Disasters Aid: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Drought Relief Payment in Mexico", joint with Alan Fuchs, estimates the effect of a government climatic contingency transfer allocated through the recently introduced rainfall indexed insurance on the 2006 Presidential election returns in Mexico. Using the discontinuity in payment based on rainfall accumulation measured on local weather stations that slightly deviate from a pre-established threshold, this work shows that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering drought relief compensation. Results show that receiving indemnity payments lead to a significant increase in average electoral support for the incumbent party of approximately 7.6 percentage points. The analysis suggests that the incumbent party is rewarded by disaster aid recipients and punished by non-recipients. This chapter provides evidence that voters evaluate government actions and respond to disaster spending contributing to the literature on retrospective voting.;The third and final chapter entitled "The Short-Run Effect of Social Transfer Programs on Citizen Attitudes: Evidence from PROGRESA-Oportunidades in Mexico" studies how individual perceptions and citizen attitudes are affected when the eligible population in the community benefits from government targeted transfers. Using panel data, I estimate a difference in difference model and explore the effect of enrollment of eligible population in the locality, as a proxy for individual exposure to targeted social policy, on levels of interest in politics, information and knowledge about political and public issues, perceptions about democracy and government, appreciation and practice of democratic values and community participation. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that in the short run, targeted conditional transfers do not impact citizen attitudes reflecting normative preferences---for example, democratic values---but do have an impact on judgments about whether political institutions and their processes meet citizens' expectations. Results suggest that social policy influences positively citizens' image about the government. Results also show an impact on community participation among the individuals in localities enrolled into PROGRESA-Oportunidades.
机译:本文旨在加深我们对公民如何为自己的个人经济状况的变化给予信贷以及如何在面对有针对性的政府转移支付时评估政治进程和结果的理解。本文由三章组成,主要研究社会政府计划的选举效果及其对公民态度的影响。第一章“中央社会计划的地方选举奖励:市长能获得信誉吗?”对中央政府控制和运作的福利计划的本地任职人员得到奖励的程度进行了实证评估。我使用墨西哥反贫困计划在各个城市推行的时机不同,以确定其对当地在位政党的选票份额的影响。我发现有证据表明,选民们从市长的利益中受益于他们的选区。估计的效果是非常积极的,对市长党的投票份额平均占2.8个百分点。对政党结盟的分析表明,这种选举效果不能解释为对地方选举中联邦任职者的奖励。我研究了其他解释,并表明对当地任职者的影响在不同政党之间是不同的,并随市政当局的特点而变化,在市长面临更具争议性的选举时,在州的首府城市和主要在城市中,这种影响更为明显。受过教育且相对富裕的城市。这一发现与以下假设相吻合:政治家有动机参与将信号传递策略与转移计划联系起来的动机。;第二章,“对自然灾害援助的投票者反应:来自墨西哥抗旱救济金的拟实验证据”,与艾伦·福克斯(Alan Fuchs)估计,通过最近推出的降雨指数保险分配的政府气候应急措施对墨西哥2006年总统大选收益的影响。使用基于在当地气象站上测得的降雨累积量的付款不连续性,该累积量略有偏离预先设定的阈值,这项工作表明选民为在任总统提供干旱补偿提供了奖励。结果表明,收到赔偿金后,现任政党的平均选举支持率显着提高了7.6个百分点。分析表明,现任政党得到了救灾援助者的奖励,并受到了非受援者的惩罚。本章提供了证据,表明选民可以评估政府的行动并应对灾难性支出,这为回顾性投票的文献做出了贡献。;第三章也是最后一章,题为“社会转移计划对公民态度的短期影响:来自墨西哥PROGRESA-Oportunidades的证据”研究了当社区中的合格人口受益于政府有针对性的转移时,个人观念和公民态度如何受到影响。使用面板数据,我估计了差异模型的差异,并探索了当地合格人口的登记对个人对有针对性的社会政策的暴露程度对政治,政治和公共问题的信息以及知识水平的影响。 ,对民主和政府的看法,对民主价值观和社区参与的欣赏和实践。这些发现与以下假设是一致的,即在短期内,有条件的有条件转移不会影响反映规范偏好(例如民主价值观)的公民态度,但会影响对政治制度及其过程是否满足公民的判断' 期望。结果表明,社会政策对公民对政府的形象产生了积极影响。结果还显示,参与PR​​OGRESA-Oportunidades的当地人对社区参与的影响。

著录项

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Berkeley.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Berkeley.;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Political Science Public Administration.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 89 p.
  • 总页数 89
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号