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Words as tools: An investigation into the normativity of meaning.

机译:词语作为工具:对意义规范性的调查。

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My thesis offers a novel approach to the problems that Ludwig Wittgenstein's Rule Following Argument presents us with, and which are formulated by Saul Kripke as skepticism about meaning. Although I draw upon Wittgenstein's work, and try to explain it, my work is not exegetical in its nature, but an attempt to offer a comprehensive solution to an important philosophical question concerning meaning.;My main premises are that the following of a linguistic rule is a normative activity (i.e., there is a sense in talking about correct and incorrect ways to follow the rule), and that in order to talk of correct and incorrect applications of a rule we must be able to point to objective criteria that justify such claims. As Kripke's work shows, such criteria are unavailable at the time when the agent is following the rule, or using the word. Thus---unlike Kripke's own solution to the problem---my suggestion is that we have to look for these criteria only after the rule has been followed. The core of my thesis is that knowing the meaning of a word involves knowing how to use it. I argue that a successful solution to the problems raised by RFA will employ Wittgenstein's analogy between words and tools. The use of words is similar to that of tools, hence like the use of a tool, the use of a word should be evaluated according to the results that it yields in the world (which naturally appear only after it has been used).;My first chapter presents the problem as it emerges in Wittgenstein's and Kripke's work. Chapter two examines and rejects various solutions to it, as currently offered in the literature. In chapter three I offer my own solution to the problem, using as an example a Robinson Crusoe who marks his way on his island with signs. The criteria for the correct use of these signs are Robinson's success in navigating the island. Chapter four addresses anticipated objections to my account. In chapter five I extend the picture and show how the lesson from the above example applies to meaning in general, and how my account fits with the major themes of the Philosophical Investigations .
机译:我的论文为路德维希·维特根斯坦的“论据后的规则”提出的问题提供了一种新颖的方法,该问题由索尔·克里普克(Saul Kripke)提出,对意义表示怀疑。尽管我借鉴了维特根斯坦的作品并试图对其进行解释,但是我的作品本质上不是释义性的,而是试图为有关意义的重要哲学问题提供全面的解决方案。我的主要前​​提是遵循语言规则是一种规范性的活动(即,在谈论遵循规则的正确和不正确的方式时有一种感觉),为了谈论规则的正确和不正确的应用,我们必须能够指出客观的标准,以证明这种合理性索赔。正如Kripke的工作所示,在座席遵循规则或使用单词时,此类标准不可用。因此,与克里普克自己解决问题的方法不同,我的建议是,我们只有在遵守规则之后才必须寻找这些标准。本文的核心是了解单词的含义涉及到如何使用它。我认为成功解决RFA问题的方法将采用维特根斯坦在词语和工具之间的类比。词语的使用与工具的用法相似,因此,就像工具的用法一样,单词的使用应根据其在世界上产生的结果(仅在使用后才自然出现)进行评估。我的第一章介绍了维特根斯坦(Wittgenstein)和克里普克(Kripke)的作品中出现的问题。第二章研究并拒绝了目前文献中提供的各种解决方案。在第三章中,我以自己的解决方案为例,以鲁滨逊·克鲁索(Robinson Crusoe)为例,他用标志标记了自己在岛上的出行方式。正确使用这些标志的标准是鲁滨逊在该岛航行中的成功。第四章讨论了对我帐户的预期异议。在第五章中,我对图片进行了说明,并展示了上述示例中的教训通常如何适用于意义,以及我的论述如何与“哲学研究”的主要主题相吻合。

著录项

  • 作者

    Shainok, David.;

  • 作者单位

    Columbia University.;

  • 授予单位 Columbia University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Language General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 186 p.
  • 总页数 186
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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