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Real exchange rates, financial repression and political regime type - A political economy analysis of sustained real exchange rate undervaluation.

机译:实际汇率,金融压制和政治体制类型-持续实际汇率低估的政治经济学分析。

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摘要

For a number of reasons, including enhanced economic growth, greater competitiveness for the export sector, and increased capital formation, governments might wish to undervalue their country's real exchange rate. However, pushing a key price of the global market like the real exchange rate out of equilibrium should, in theory, be unsustainable due to automatic adjustments in either the price level or the nominal exchange rate unless frictions are introduced into either of these two adjustment channels. I argue here that financial repression is a policy option that governments can pursue in order to introduce a substantial friction into the nominal exchange rate adjustment channel. Furthermore, I argue that due to the political costs associated with a sustained undervalued real exchange rate, such as repressed consumption and reduced purchasing power for the populace, autocracies are more likely to pursue these policies in order to achieve a sustained undervaluation. In order to test these hypothesized relationships, I use two random-effects logistic models to examine sustained periods of real exchange rate undervaluation lasting at least 3 and 4 years, respectively, and an ordinary least squares regression for a 5-year averaged dataset. I construct a main dataset consisting of 2591 country-year data points covering the time period of 1973-2005, and a 5-year averaged dataset consisting of 554 country-time-period data points covering 6 time periods. I draw on the work of Rodrik (2008) for my measure of real exchange rate undervaluation; Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) and Ito and Chinn (2006) for my measures of financial repression; and Marshall and Jaggers (2002) for my measure of political system. Taken together, the results of these models provide support for the hypothesized relationship between autocracies and financial repression on the one hand, and a sustained undervaluation of the real exchange rate on the other hand.
机译:由于多种原因,包括经济增长加快,出口部门的竞争力增强以及资本形成增加,各国政府不妨低估其实际汇率。但是,从理论上讲,由于价格水平或名义汇率的自动调整,除非将这两个调整渠道中的任何一个引入摩擦,否则将全球市场的关键价格(例如实际汇率)推向失衡应该是不可持续的。 。我在这里辩称,金融压制是各国政府可以采取的政策选择,目的是在名义汇率调整渠道中引入实质性的摩擦。此外,我认为,由于与实际汇率持续低估相关的政治成本,例如居民的消费受到压制和购买力下降,专制国家更有可能采取这些政策以实现持续的低估。为了检验这些假设的关系,我使用了两个随机效应逻辑模型来检验分别持续至少3年和4年的实际汇率低估的持续时间,以及5年平均数据集的普通最小二乘回归。我构建了一个主要数据集,该数据集包含覆盖1973-2005年时间段的2591个国家/地区年数据点,以及一个包含覆盖6个时间段的554个国家/时间段数据点的5年平均数据集。我用Rodrik(2008)的工作来衡量实际汇率被低估的情况。 Abiad,Detragiache和Tressel(2010)以及Ito和Chinn(2006)对我的财务抑制措施进行了研究;以及Marshall和Jaggers(2002)对我的政治制度的衡量。综上所述,这些模型的结果一方面为专制与金融压制之间的假设关系提供了支持,另一方面为实际汇率的持续低估提供了支持。

著录项

  • 作者

    Hipolit, J. Andrew.;

  • 作者单位

    Georgetown University.;

  • 授予单位 Georgetown University.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.;Sociology Public and Social Welfare.
  • 学位 M.P.P.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 53 p.
  • 总页数 53
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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