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Performance analysis of decentralized supply chains: Considerations of channel power and subcontracting.

机译:分散式供应链的绩效分析:渠道力量和分包合同的考虑。

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摘要

Our work, comprising three essays, examines supply chain agent performance in a variety of decentralized systems under both stochastic and deterministic customer demand. In the first two essays, we develop models for both periodic and continuous review inventory policies when the decision-making rights are split between a supplier and a retailer. The second essay also examines a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) agreement. The last essay proposes a novel approach to workload balancing for a company that faces deterministic nonstationary demand and has little, or no, ability to hold inventory.; The first two essays seek to answer the following research questions: (1) when does decentralized decision making result in the greatest loss in supply chain performance and (2) what effect does the distribution of channel power have on system and individual agent performance. Channel power here refers to an agent's relative ability to control the decision making process and is modeled using a game-theoretic framework. We characterize optimal policies where possible and we use numerical analysis to generate insights. We find that, from a supply chain perspective, asymmetric power decision structures lead to better performance and customer service. Surprisingly, we identify cases where the lowest costs are incurred at the agent level when the agent is a follower and not a leader in the Stackelberg game. Our analysis also identifies the environmental conditions when the penalty from decentralized decision making is largest and shows that concentrating channel power with one of the agents can represent a viable alternative to coordination mechanisms, when the latter are costly to implement.; In the third essay, we use Fourier analysis and Walsh basis functions to decompose an input workload profile into a portfolio of recurrent insourcing and outsourcing contracts to better achieve some desired constant workload level. In addition, we develop mathematical programs based on principles from goal programming formulations to answer important practical questions such as: (1) how should a company create a portfolio of contracts to balance workload over time; (2) how should the portfolio be customized to reflect special needs with respect to time, volume, etc., (3) what is the benefit of holding inventory as a supplement to subcontracting.
机译:我们的工作包括三篇文章,研究了随机和确定性客户需求下各种分散系统中供应链代理的绩效。在前两篇文章中,当决策权在供应商和零售商之间分配时,我们为定期和连续审查库存策略开发模型。第二篇文章还研究了供应商管理的库存(VMI)协议。上一篇文章提出了一种新颖的方法,用于面对确定性非固定需求且几乎没有或根本没有库存能力的公司。前两篇文章试图回答以下研究问题:(1)分散决策何时导致供应链绩效的最大损失;(2)渠道权力的分配对系统和单个代理的绩效有什么影响。这里的渠道能力是指代理人控制决策过程的相对能力,并使用博弈论框架进行建模。我们在可能的情况下确定最佳政策的特征,并使用数值分析来产生见解。我们发现,从供应链的角度来看,不对称的电源决策结构可以带来更好的性能和客户服务。出人意料的是,我们确定了当代理商是追随者而不是Stackelberg游戏的领导者时,在代理商一级产生最低成本的情况。我们的分析还确定了分散决策产生的损失最大时的环境条件,并显示了在协调机构成本高昂的情况下,将渠道权力集中于其中一个代理可以代表协调机制的可行替代方案。在第三篇文章中,我们使用傅立叶分析和Walsh基函数将输入的工作量配置文件分解为循环内包和外包合同的组合,以更好地实现所需的恒定工作量水平。此外,我们根据目标编程公式的原理开发数学程序,以回答重要的实际问题,例如:(1)公司应如何创建合同组合以平衡工作量? (2)如何定制投资组合以反映有关时间,数量等方面的特殊需求,(3)持有库存作为分包的补充有什么好处。

著录项

  • 作者

    Bichescu, Bogdan C.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Cincinnati.;

  • 授予单位 University of Cincinnati.;
  • 学科 Business Administration General.; Operations Research.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 139 p.
  • 总页数 139
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;运筹学;
  • 关键词

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