The political economy of international monetary integration in the post-World War II period.

摘要

This dissertation answers the key question: Why do states or, rather, their governments decide to participate and stay in IMI arrangements? It does so by establishing the economic and political determinants of IMI formation and sustainability. Some of these determinants are well known to the literature but others are not. For instance, it takes into account the strategic nature of a national currency for a government when it comes to ensuring its survival if threatened by war and/or domestic conflict. Furthermore, it considers the fact that many of the economic and political variables that affect IMI are in turn influenced by states' political regimes and/or regional hegemony. The determinants of IMI represent a general theoretical framework that is applicable to all past, present, and future IMI cases. To validate this framework, the dissertation offers the first known econometric test of the formation of IMI arrangements, using a large binary time-series cross-section dataset covering the years 1960-2000. Predicted probabilities regarding the formation of IMI arrangements are then compared with the reality of IMI and non-IMI cases in order to explain discrepancies, thereby enhancing the theoretical argument and exposing the limits of the statistical model and data. Finally, an examination of the sustainability and failure of existing and past IMI cases, respectively, allows us to further validate the general applicability of the theoretical framework developed herein. With these efforts, the present study provides a much more complete and informed picture of international monetary integration in the post-World War II period.