Towards Situating Solidarity in a Thomistic Understanding of Virtue.

摘要

The idea of speaking of solidarity as a virtue of interdependence appeared in Catholic Social Teaching (CST) toward the end of the 20th century. As he travelled the world, Pope John Paul II (1978-2005) was struck by the widening gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" resulting in widespread poverty and underdevelopment. John Paul II attributed this problem to the decline in the concern for common good. He then proposed solidarity as a "path to true development" arguing that in a de facto interdependent world, it is by embracing solidarity as a virtue of interdependence that we can be better disposed to challenge the status quo (SRS, 38)..;Although the phenomenon of solidarity is as old as humanity, its development as a virtue of interdependence in Catholic social teaching raises questions about its plausibility as a true virtue in traditional virtue ethics. While some thinkers argue that solidarity is more the absence of a fault than a virtue, others defend it as a virtue based on Thomistic virtue theory. Still, amongst thinkers that defend it as a virtue, opinions are divided whether it is a virtue of justice or charity. John Paul II, the first to name solidarity a virtue was not clear on this.;This dissertation settles this controversy by arguing that solidarity is a virtue fitting in the moral virtue category, but occupying space of its own in the Thomistic schema. Thus, chapter one investigates the origin of solidarity as a response to interdependence prior to emergence in CST. Chapter two looks into its emergence in CST as a virtue of interdependence. Chapter three examines the concept of virtue in virtue ethics. In the light of the basic characteristics of Thomistic virtue ethics, chapter four argues that as a virtue necessitated by and particularly suited for contemporary interdependence, solidarity can be situated as a virtue fitting in the moral virtue category, but occupying space of its own in the schema.