Crises as opportunity: Innovation in federal homeland security agencies, 1946--2004.

摘要

This dissertation provides a history of post World War II homeland security agencies. It analyzes how different kinds of agencies adapt to address new problems and, where they fail to do so, aims to discover what causes their failure. How an agency adapts, however, depends on whether or not it possesses bureaucratic autonomy. Therefore, the account that follows highlights and evaluates the role that bureaucratic autonomy plays in adaptability. Autonomy occurs when, over a sustained period of time, agencies develop and exercise preferences independent from those of the president or Congress. Three agencies presented here gained a relatively high degree autonomy, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Federal Emergency Management Agency. Two did not: the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Federal Aviation Administration.; By itself, bureaucratic autonomy is neither bad nor good. Rather, it affects whether and how agencies adapt. All agencies can potentially adapt, but the level of autonomy affects the way in which agencies might change. For an agency that possesses autonomy reformers must understand the sources of its autonomy---whether in the nature of its tasks or in its connection to powerful groups---in order to direct the agency to focus on new tasks. Autonomous and non-autonomous agencies alike adapt when they have three kinds of resources: a profession, administrative politicians, and an adaptable organizing concept. Bureaucratic failure and a lack of adaptability can be traced to a lack of these three resources.