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Two-Head Dragon Protocol: Preventing Cloning of Signature Keys Work in Progress

机译:两头龙协议:防止克隆签名密钥正在进行中

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摘要

Cryptographic techniques based on possession of private keys rely very much on the assumption that the private keys can be used only by the key's owner. As contemporary architectures of operating systems do not provide such a guarantee, special devices such as smart cards and TPM modules are intended to serve as secure storage for such keys. When carefully designed, these devices can be examined and certified as secure devices for holding private keys. How ever, this approach has a serious drawback: certification procedure is expensive, requires very specialized knowledge and its result cannot be verified indepen dently by an end-user. On the other hand, malicious cryptography techniques can be used to circumvent the security mechanisms installed in a device. Moreover, in practice we often are forced to retreat to solutions such as generation of the private keys outside secure devices. In this case we are forced to trust blindly the parties providing such services. We propose an architecture for electronic signatures and signature creation devices such that in case of key leakage, any use of leaked keys will be detected with a fairly high probability. The main idea is that using the private keys outside the legitimate place leads to disclosure of these keys preventing any claims of validity of signatures in any thinkable legal situation. Our approach is stronger than fail-stop signatures. Indeed, fail-stop signatures protect against derivation of keys via cryptanalysis of public keys, but cannot do anything about key leakage or making a copy of the key by a service provider that generates the key pairs for the clients. Our approach is a simple alternative to the usual attempts to make crypto graphic cards and TPM as tamper resistant as possible, that is, to solve the prob lem alone by hardware means. It also addresses the question of using private keys stored in not highly secure environment without a dramatic redesign of operating systems. It can be used as a stand alone solution, or just as an additional mecha nism for building trust of an end-user.
机译:基于拥有私钥的密码技术非常依赖于以下假设:私钥只能由密钥所有者使用。由于现代的操作系统体系结构无法提供这种保证,因此,专用设备(例如智能卡和TPM模块)将用作此类密钥的安全存储。经过精心设计,可以将这些设备检查并认证为用于持有私钥的安全设备。但是,这种方法有一个严重的缺点:认证过程昂贵,需要非常专业的知识,并且最终用户无法独立验证其结果。另一方面,恶意加密技术可用于规避设备中安装的安全机制。而且,在实践中,我们经常被迫退缩到诸如在安全设备外部生成私钥之类的解决方案。在这种情况下,我们被迫盲目地信任提供此类服务的各方。我们提出了一种用于电子签名和签名创建设备的体系结构,以便在密钥泄漏的情况下,泄漏密钥的任何使用都将以很高的概率被检测到。主要思想是,在合法场所之外使用私钥会导致这些密钥的泄露,从而在任何可考虑的法律情况下均无法要求签名有效。我们的方法比故障停止签名更强大。确实,故障停止签名可以防止通过对公钥进行密码分析而派生密钥,但是对于密钥泄漏或服务生成者(为客户端生成密钥对)进行密钥复制,无法做任何事情。我们的方法是通常尝试使加密图形卡和TPM尽可能防篡改的简单替代方法,也就是说,仅通过硬件手段解决问题。它还解决了使用存储在不是高度安全的环境中的私钥而不对操作系统进行重大重新设计的问题。它可以用作独立解决方案,也可以用作建立最终用户信任的附加机制。

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