LEARNING FROM FAILURE OR FAILURE TO LEARN: LESSONS FROM PAST NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENTS

摘要

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 many governments and the IAEA have pledged to take additional significant steps to reduce the risk that terrorist organizations will acquire nuclear material or weapons. It is by no means clear, however, that the efforts undertaken thus far have been commensurate with the urgency and magnitude of the threat. Government policies are sticky, international and domestic bureaucracies are often slow to adapt to new challenges, and global cooperation is difficult to create and sustain. Given the magnitude of the threat, each government needs to learn from its own and other governments' successes and failures in this global effort to reduce the danger of terrorism. Organizational learning is, however, notoriously difficult, especially concerning nuclear physical security policy, an arena in which governments often want to protect secrets about their programmes, bureaucracies want to protect their autonomy from outside influence, and individuals and subunits want to protect their reputations and budgets.