An Principal-Agent Analysis of Energy Performance Contracting Mechanism Applied in Existing Building Energy Efficiency Retrofit

摘要

Energy performance contracting mechanism is an effective approach to achieve the market-oriented operation of existing buildings' energy-saving retrofit, whose rapid and wide-spread application, however, is impeded by energy-saving moral hazard problems. This article analyzes the optimal incentive contract design of energy performance contracting applied in existing building energy efficiency retrofit. By establishing the principal-agent model between Energy Service Company Organization (ESCO) and the owner of existing building, optimal incentive mechanism is analyzed under symmetric information and asymmetric information conditions. Besides, agency costs and the influence that other observed variables have on optimal incentive contract are also discussed. A series of suggestions is proposed to facilitate the development of energy performance contracting mechanism in aspects of promoting standardized contract templates, raising social awareness and providing support for independent third-party energy audit institutions. Results of this study show that when information is symmetric, ESCO does not undertake any risk and the optimal incentive contract loses incentive effects for ESCO. When asymmetric information exists, the risks of energy efficiency retrofit are shared by owners and ESCO, the optimal effort level is lower than that of symmetric information. If the correlation between other observed variables and outputs exists, the owner should set reasonable incentive intensity according to the main influencing factor of outputs.