THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL RESPONSE AND MITIGATION TO NUCLEAR RADIATION DISPERSAL DEVICES ('DIRTY BOMBS') AND SABOTAGE INCIDENTS

摘要

The past two decades have seen the development of trans-national organizations of anarchists and terrorists whose sole function is to either destroy or disrupt the continuity of the political structures currently in place. Disruption of a system’s infrastructure may be efficiently accomplished by utilization of one of two modes: physical-biological (biological, chemical, nuclear weapons) and computer system disruption and destruction (cyberterrorism). The most efficient disruptive device weapons would seem to be those associated with cyberterrorism. The nuclear physical-biological devices are often generically referred to as “dirty bombs.” In nuclear parlance, the term is used interchangeably with the RDD (Radioactive Dispersal Device) acronym. A RDD is a combination of conventional explosives with radioactive materials; it is neither fission nor fusion nuclear device. The lethality of the radioactive material is variable, ranging from high level (e.g., spent nuclear fuel [SNF]) to low-level waste originating from medical, industrial, research, and power generation facilities. Devices of choice must be easy to deliver, moderately safe to handle, reasonably obtainable, technically simple, and not too costly. As a result, it is to be expected that the devices used will not use high-level waste but, instead, intermediate to low-level waste obtainable from disused sealed radioactive sources (SRS) and such low-level (GTCC) and intermediate-level (TRU) wastes as available. The purpose is to use the device to disrupt the system, hence the reference of weapons of mass disruption or hysteria (WMH) rather than weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Except for the potential panic and hysteria it delivers and the cost of the subsequent cleanup, RDDs are a relatively ineffective destructive device, except in the strength of the explosive utilized. This conclusion was reached in 1987 when Iraq used these devices. Incidences involving RDDs would seem destined to occur. The question is, what will be the response structure prior to, during, and after the incident? Fortunately, most cities, as a result of chemical spills and the occasional biological spill, have at least a limited disaster plan in place. Traditionally, it has been the responsibility of the police and fire departments to react. Logically,it makes sense that they do the same (with proper instruction) should an incident occur with a non-fission/fusion nuclear device. The problem is that while national and society response manuals are available, the individual characteristics of cities indicate that such can only serve as a loose set of guidelines. Cities, regardless of size, may be characterized as provincial regional agglomerations of geodemographic villages, districts, barrios, etc. The city of El Paso, a largely bilingual city of over 700,000, is on the border between two nations. It is only the northern part of a 2.2 million metroplex when taken in combination with the 1.5 million of the Mexican city of Juarez. The two adjacent transnational and bicultural cities of the metroplex are separated from each other only by the intermittently dry, partially cement lined channel of the Rio Grande. These two cities form an amalgamated, international metroplex with a unique set of social, environmental, cultural, and political (national, state, and local levels) problems and benefits. Additionally, a growing population in New Mexico adds an interstate jurisdictional problem Generically, the response to a nuclear incident should include: a clear and flexible chain of command, designated first-responders and their protocol, transportation control, hospital resources and response, management and treatment of casualties (injured, externally exposed, internally contaminated), public and governmental information dissemination, and clean-up and remediation of the incident area. The conclusion would seem to be that, with some general guidelines, each of the