Research on ethics games between the MNEs and Chinese government

摘要

The MNEs are inevitably confronted with various discrepancies and even conflicts during their production and operation in China because of the profit-pursuing nature of capital. In order to solve these conflicts, ethics games between the MNEs and Chinese government are proposed in this paper. It can be deduced that there are four main factors accounting for the probability of cooperation, (1) the MNEs' payoff when strategy set 1 (cooperation & honoring commitment) is adopted; (2) the MNEs' payoff when strategy set 2 (cooperation & dishonoring commitment) is employed; (3) probability that China has a supervising and administrating government; (4) punishment on the MNEs by Chinese government. To be specific, the higher probability of a law-based government, the stronger punishment on illegal behaviors of the MNEs, and thus more payoff is yielded to the MNEs which choose strategy set 1 (cooperation & honoring commitment), but less to those which adopt strategy set 2 (cooperation & dishonoring commitment). Chinese regulatory government can stimulate the MNEs to honor their commitments that they should shoulder their social responsibility in China and manage their behaviors within the framework of business ethics and codes of ethics. Those findings will provide references for decisionmakers, the government and other departments involved.