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Empirical Study on Game Theory of China's Food Safety Supervision-on the Basis of Game Analysis of Government and Food Enterprises

机译:中国食品安全监管博弈论的实证研究 - 政府与食品企业博弈分析

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From the perspective of economics, this study applies the game theory to analyze the failure of China's food safety supervision, clear the main objects of government regulation and regulatory measures, determine the necessary conditions for the government to implement effective supervision and make suggestions to improve our system of food safety supervision. Since the food is the necessity that human beings live on, food safety has become the common topic which shares all human beings' concern. The food safety incidents which happened recent years have not only affected the health of people, but also had negative effects on economic development or even the social stability. Given this, the government has continuously intensified the supervision on food safety, implementing many policies like "Food Safety Project" and mandatory authentication plan of pollution-free food. In National Video and Telephone Conference of Strengthening Food Safety on June 11th, 2015, Prime Minister Li Keqiang put forward that food safety concerned everyone's physical health and life safety and it was the aspiration of the broad masses that could eat hearty and safe food, which was also the basic demand of building well-off society in an all-around way. On this background, this study began from the game analysis of government and food enterprises, based on Game theory, Stakeholder theory and so on, to build the game model of government and food enterprises and to analyze when faced with food safety supervision, the two parties would take what measures to obtain the maximum effect. At last, the paper proposed some suggestions for policies on reforming food safety supervision system.
机译:从经济学的角度来看,本研究适用于博弈论分析中国食品安全监管的失败,清楚政府监管措施的主要目的,确定政府实施有效监管的必要条件,提出建议改善我们的建议食品安全监督系统。由于食物是人类生活的必要性,食品安全已成为共同讨论所有人类关注的共同点。近年来发生的食品安全事件不仅影响了人们的健康,而且对经济发展甚至社会稳定也产生了负面影响。鉴于这一点,政府不断加剧了食品安全监管,实施了许多政策,如“食品安全项目”和无污染食品的强制性认证计划。在2015年6月11日加强食品安全的国家视频和电话会议上,李克强总理提出了食品安全有关每个人的身体健康和生命安全,这是可以吃丰盛和安全食品的广泛群众的愿望也是全面地建立小康社会的基本要求。在这个背景下,本研究开始从政府和食品企业的游戏分析,基于博弈论,利益相关者理论等,建立政府和食品企业的游戏模式,并在面对食品安全监管时分析,两者缔约方将采取哪些措施获得最大效果。最后,本文提出了一些关于改革食品安全监督系统政策的建议。

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